Research Reports

Report 2006-05: Advisory Service Marketing Profiles for Soybeans over 2002-2004

June 2006

Evelyn V. Colino, Silvina M. Cabrini, Nicole M. Aulerich, Tracy L. Brandenberger,
Robert P. Merrin, Wei Shi, Scott H. Irwin, Darrel L. Good, and Joao Martines-Filho [1]

Copyright 2006 by Evelyn V. Colino, Silvina M. Cabrini, Nicole M. Aulerich, Tracy L. Brandenberger, Robert P. Merrin, Wei Shi, Scott H. Irwin, Darrel L. Good, and Joao Martines-Filho. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.

DISCLAIMER

The advisory service marketing recommendations used in this research represent the best efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made available by each advisory service. In cases where a recommendation is vague or unclear, some judgment is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular recommendation or how to implement the recommendation. Given that some recommendations are subject to interpretation, the possibility is acknowledged that the AgMAS track record of recommendations for a given program may differ from that stated by the advisory service, or from that recorded by another subscriber.

Introduction

Marketing decisions are an important part of farm business management. Farmers are interested in the possibility of enhancing farm income and reducing income variability when marketing crops. There are many tools to assist farmers in such marketing decisions. Several surveys, including Patrick, Musser and Eckman (1998) and Schroeder et al. (1998), report that farmers specifically viewed one of these tools, professional market advisory services, as an important source of marketing information and advice. It is often thought that advisory services can process market information more rapidly and efficiently than farmers to determine the most appropriate marketing decisions, but limited research has been conducted in the area.

In 1994, the Agricultural Market Advisory Service (AgMAS) Project was initiated at the University of Illinois with the goal of providing unbiased and rigorous evaluation of advisory services for producers. Since its inception, the AgMAS Project has collected real-time marketing recommendations for at least 23 market advisory services each year and analyzed the performance of these services. In a recent publication, Irwin et al. (2005) evaluate corn and soybean advisory services over 1995-2004 and the results provide limited evidence that advisory programs as a group outperform market benchmarks, particularly after considering risk. The evidence about performance is more positive with respect to farmer benchmarks even after taking risk into account. For example, the average advisory return relative to farmer benchmarks is $8 to $12 per acre with only a marginal increase in risk.

AgMAS comparisons of net price received among advisory services are an important source of information for farmers in selecting an advisory service. However, pricing performance is not the only relevant aspect in the evaluation of advisory services. Pennings et al. (2004) show that the nature of the recommendations made by advisory services also is an important factor in the way farmers evaluate services. This research suggests that the nature of recommendations can be thought of as the “marketing philosophy” or “marketing style” of an advisory service.[2] Marketing style is defined by the tools that a service recommends and the complexity of the recommended marketing strategies. For example, recommendations may differ as to whether or not futures and options contracts are used, frequency of transactions and average amount per transaction. Farmers and other market observers are familiar with the idea that advisory services have different marketing styles. Williams (2001) identifies the marketing styles of five prominent advisors, labeled somewhat colorfully, as the banker, race car driver, astronaut, sprinter and insurance agent.

It is reasonable, then, to assert that farmers will prefer to follow a service with a style that matches their personal approach to marketing. However, objective information about advisory service marketing style has been quite difficult for farmers to obtain in the past. The research found in several AgMAS reports provides a useful starting point.[3] Bertoli et al. (1999) examine corn and soybean marketing style from two perspectives for the services evaluated by the AgMAS Project in 1995. The first is the construction of a detailed “menu” of the tools and strategies used by each of the advisory services in 1995. The menu describes the type of pricing tool, frequency of transactions and magnitude of transactions. The second is the development of a daily index of the net amount sold by each market advisory service. To construct such an index, the various futures, options and cash positions recommended for a service on a given day are weighted by the respective position "delta." Daily values of the index are plotted for the entire 1995 crop year, generating the marketing "profile" for a service. Martines-Filho et al. (2003a, 2003b) and Colino et al. (2004a, 2004b) extend Bertoli’s original research by constructing corn and soybean marketing profiles and loan deficiency payment/marketing loan gain profiles (LDP/MLG) for all advisory programs tracked by the AgMAS Project for the 1995- 2001 crop years.

The purpose of this report is to present marketing profiles and loan deficiency payment/marketing loan gain profiles for the advisory services followed by the AgMAS Project for 2002 through 2004 soybean crops. In addition, the average profiles for 1995-2001 found in Colino et al (2004b) are updated through the 2004 crop year. As noted above, marketing profiles are constructed by plotting the cumulative net amount priced under each service’s set of recommendations throughout a crop year. LDP/MLG profiles are constructed by plotting the cumulative percentage of the crop on which the LDP/MLG was claimed during the crop year. The soybean marketing profiles for 1995 are slightly revised versions of those presented in Bertoli et al. (1999). Finally, note that this report is not intended to be a complete analysis of advisory service marketing style in soybeans. Further analysis is required to categorize services by the types of tools and strategies used, as well as their typical marketing profile. Ultimately, the goal is to determine style categories for advisory services based on objective, quantitative factors. Previous studies of mutual fund and hedge fund style provide useful models for this effort (e.g., Sharpe, 1992; Brown and Goetzmann, 1997; Brown and Goetzmann, 2001).

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. First, the data collection procedures and assumptions employed by the AgMAS Project to evaluate advisory services’ recommendations are presented. Second, the construction of marketing and LDP/MLG profiles is explained. Finally, the individual crop year profiles for the advisory services in soybeans for 2002, 2003, and 2004 are presented, along with average, maximum and minimum profiles across 1995-2004.

Data Collection

The marketing profiles presented in this report are based on data generated by the AgMAS Project. This section describes briefly the AgMAS data collection procedure. For a more complete explanation, refer to Irwin et al. (2006).

The market advisory services evaluated by the AgMAS Project do not comprise the population or a random sample of market advisory services available to farmers. Neither approach is feasible because no public agency or trade group assembles a list of advisory services that could be considered the "population." To assemble the sample of services for the AgMAS Project, five criteria were developed to define an agricultural market advisory service and a list of services was assembled.

The first criterion is that marketing recommendations from an advisory service must be received electronically in real-time, in the form of satellite-delivered pages, Internet web pages or e-mail messages. Services delivered electronically generally ensure that recommendations are made available to the AgMAS Project at the same time as farm subscribers.

The second criterion used to identify services is that a service has to provide marketing recommendations to farmers rather than (or in addition to) speculators or traders. Some of the services tracked by the AgMAS Project do provide speculative trading advice, but that advice must be clearly differentiated from marketing advice to farmers for the service to be included.

The third criterion is that marketing recommendations from an advisory service must be in a form suitable for application to a representative farmer. That is, the recommendations have to specify the percentage of the crop involved in each transaction and the price or date at which each transaction is to be implemented.

The fourth criterion is that advisory services must provide “one-size fits all” marketing recommendations so there is no uncertainty about implementation. While different programs for basic types of subscribers may be tracked for an advisory service (e.g., a cash only program versus a futures and options hedging and cash program), it is not feasible to track services that provide “customized” recommendations for individual clients.

The fifth criterion addresses the issue of whether a candidate service is a viable, commercial business. This issue has arisen due to the extremely low cost and ease of distributing information over the Internet, either via e-mail or a website. It is possible for an individual with little actual experience and no paying subscribers to start a “market advisory service” by using the Internet. The specific criterion used is that a candidate advisory service must have provided recommendations to paying subscribers for a minimum of two marketing years before the service can be included in the AgMAS study.

Having assembled a sample of advisory services, the process of collecting recommendations begins with the purchase of subscriptions to each of the services. The information is received electronically, via satellite, websites or e-mail. Staff members of the AgMAS Project record the information provided by each advisory service on a daily basis. For the services that provide multiple daily updates, information is recorded as it is provided through the day.

Some advisory services offer two or more distinct marketing programs. This typically takes the form of one set of advice for marketers who are willing to use futures and options, and a separate set of advice for farmers who only wish to make cash sales.[4] In this situation, recommendations under each program are recorded and treated individually as distinct strategies to be evaluated.

At the end of the marketing period, all of the (filled) recommendations are aligned in chronological order. The advice for a given crop year is considered complete for each advisory program when cumulative cash sales of the commodity reach 100%, all futures positions covering the crop are offset, all option positions covering the crop are either offset or expire, and the advisory program discontinues giving advice for that crop year.

The final set of recommendations attributed to each advisory program represents the best efforts of the AgMAS Project staff to accurately and fairly interpret the information made available by each advisory program. In cases where a recommendation is considered vague or unclear, some judgment is exercised as to whether or not to include that particular recommendation or how to implement the recommendation. Given that some recommendations are subject to interpretation, the possibility is acknowledged that the AgMAS track record of recommendations for a given program may differ from that stated by the advisory program, or from that recorded by another subscriber.

Marketing Assumptions

In order to evaluate the advisory services’ recommendations certain explicit assumptions need to be made. The assumptions are intended to accurately depict “real-world” marketing conditions facing a representative central Illinois corn and soybean farmer. Key assumptions are explained in this section. Complete details on all assumptions can be found in Irwin et al. (2006).

First, a two-year marketing window, from September 1^st of the year previous to harvest through August 31^st of the year after the harvest, is used in the analysis. Note that throughout the remainder of this report, the term "crop year" is used to represent the two-year marketing window.

Second, since most of the advisory program recommendations are given in terms of the proportion of total production (e.g., “sell 5% of 2003 crop today”), some assumption must be made about the amount of production to be marketed. When making transactions prior to harvest, the actual yield is unknown, and the expected yield is employed to compute the bushel amount for each transaction. The expected yield for each year is based upon a log-linear trend regression model of actual yields. It is assumed that after harvest begins farmers have a reasonable idea of actual realized yield. The assumed actual yield corresponds to the Central Illinois Crop Reporting District yield.

Since harvest occurs at different dates each year, estimates of harvest progress as reported for central Illinois are used. Harvest progress estimates typically are not made available soon enough to identify precisely the beginning of harvest, so an estimate is made based upon available data. Specifically, the date on which 50% of the crop is harvested is defined as the mid-point of harvest. The entire harvest period then is defined as a five-week window, beginning two and one-half weeks before the harvest mid-point, and ending two and one-half weeks after the harvest mid-point. To compute the bushel amount for each transaction, the percentage recommended is multiplied by the expected yield, if the position is opened before the first day of harvest, or by the actual yield, if the position is opened after the first day of harvest. This procedure implicitly assumes that the “lumpiness” of futures and/or options contracts is not an issue. Lumpiness is caused by the fact that futures contracts are for specific amounts, such as 5,000 bushels per CBOT soybean futures contract. For large-scale farmers, it is unlikely that this assumption adversely affects the accuracy of the results. This may not be the case for small- to intermediate-scale farmers, who are less able to sell in 5,000-bushel increments.

In some cases the AgMAS Project stopped following a program, either because the program went out of business or it stopped making recommendations for farmers. In such cases, it is assumed that cash bushels after the date of discontinuation are sold in equal amounts over the remaining days of the marketing window. Any futures or options positions that remain open on the date of discontinuation are closed on that date using settlement futures prices or options premiums.

Construction of Marketing Profiles

The marketing profile of an advisory program for a given crop year is constructed by plotting the cumulative net amount priced during the marketing season. The amount priced depends on the various positions recommended by the program. It is necessary to weight the different recommended transactions in some way to compute a daily index of the amount priced.

The computation of the percentage of the crop priced from cash, forward contract or futures positions is straightforward. Specifically, the percentage of the crop sold under cash, forward contracts or short futures can be added to compute total percentage priced. Likewise, the percentage of grain owned under long futures positions is subtracted.[5] For example, on a given pre-harvest day, assume that since the beginning of the crop year a service has recommended selling futures for 30% of expected production, cash forward contracting another 20% and, later, buying futures for 10% of the expected production. The value of the index on that day would be 40% (30% + 20% - 10%).

On the other hand, put and call options represent a more complicated situation since they are not straightforward purchases or sales of grain. To compute the percentage of the crop priced from positions in options markets, a measure of option risk, called “delta,” is employed. The option delta indicates how much the option price will change per unit change in the price of the underlying asset, in this case, the futures price. The next section explains how deltas for calls and puts are computed and used in the computation of the daily index of the amount priced.

Option Deltas

Option deltas are computed using Black’s model (Black, 1976), which is a valuation model for futures options. Black’s model computes the premium for calls and puts on futures as a function of the risk-free interest rate, time to expiration and the relationship between the option strike price and the price of the underlying futures contract:

[6]The formulas to compute the options delta are as follows:

In this study, a two-step procedure is used to estimate options deltas. First, equation (1) or (2) is employed to compute the “implied” volatility of the underlying futures prices. Option premiums and futures prices are obtained from the Chicago Board of Trade for each day that an option position is opened. The risk-free interest rate employed is the three-month Treasury bill rate, obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Implied volatility is computed by solving equations (1) or (2) for the volatility that equates the observed market premium with the model value. Since it is not possible to invert equations (1) and (2) to express volatility as a function of the rest of the parameters, an iterative search is applied to find the implied volatility values.[7] Then, the estimated volatilities are used in formulas (5) and (6) to obtain the delta values for the recommended option positions.

The delta for option contracts changes daily, since the futures price will likely change from one day to the next. Time-to-expiration will, of course, decrease as time passes and volatility may change with time. Therefore, deltas employed in the construction of the marketing profiles are updated on a daily basis.

Long calls have positive delta values, since they represent the right to buy the underlying asset in the future at the exercise price, and therefore, become more valuable as the futures price increases. Deltas for call options must take values between 0 and 1. Calls that are deep-in-themoney have deltas close to one, and those which are deep out-of-the money have deltas close to zero. Near-the-money calls have deltas close to 0.5. Long puts have negative deltas values, since they represent the right to sell the underlying asset at the exercise price, and hence, the position becomes more valuable as the futures price decreases. Deltas for put options must fall between -1 and 0. Deep-in-the-money puts have deltas near -1 and deep-out-of-money puts have deltas of 0. Near-the-money puts have deltas close to -0.5. The deltas for short calls and puts are just the negative of the delta values for the corresponding long positions.

As mentioned earlier, deltas indicate approximately how much option prices will change per unit of change in the price of the underlying asset. For example, if the delta for a November soybean futures call is 0.8, a $0.10/bushel increase in the November soybean futures price will increase the option value by $0.08/bushel. Options deltas can also be interpreted as the equivalent position in the underlying asset in terms of price action sensitivity. For example, if an individual holds a long call on a soybean futures contract for 5,000 bushels, a call delta of 0.5 indicates that the call position is equivalent, in terms of price action sensitivity, to a long position in the futures contract for 2,500 bushels of soybeans. If the price of November soybean futures increases by $0.10/bushel, both the value of the call contract and the position in long futures increase by $250, indicating that they are equivalent in terms of price risk. This notion of delta is used to compute the cumulative net amount priced from positions in options markets. The equivalent long futures position is obtained by multiplying the size of the option position by its delta and the negative of this amount corresponds to the amount priced from that specific option. The next section presents the details of the computation of the index of the cumulative amount priced, where deltas are employed to convert an option position into the equivalent amount priced by futures positions.

Computation of the Cumulative Net Amount Priced

Option deltas allow all positions in cash, forward and futures and options markets recommended by a program to be combined into an index of the cumulative percentage of a crop priced for each day in the marketing window. The index value for an advisory program on day t is based on the transactions recommended by that program since the beginning of the crop year up to day t. For the pre-harvest period, the index reflects the amount priced as a percentage of the expected yield. Equation (7) presents the index computation for the pre-harvest period (for t between the first day of the marketing window and the day before the first day of harvest):

It is assumed that farmers learn the actual yield on the first day of harvest. At this time, total production is known and so, the percentage of grain priced before harvest is adjusted. For example, suppose that the expected yield for a certain crop year is 40 bushels/acre and the preharvest percentage priced based on this yield is 50%. Suppose that harvest arrives and the actual yield turns out to be 50 bushels/acre. The amount priced on the first day of harvest becomes 40% (50%*40/50). Hence, for the period after harvest, the index considers positions opened before harvest as based on actual yield. Equation (8) shows the computation of the index in the post-harvest period (for t between the first day of harvest and the last day in the marketing window):

The treatment of three other types of contracts should be mentioned as special cases. First, percentages of the crop sold through basis contracts are recorded on the date the cash price is determined (by setting the futures price). This results in basis contracts being treated the same as forward contracts, except that the percentages are not recorded when the basis contract is first entered, but when the final cash price is established. Second, percentages of the crop sold through hedge-to-arrive contracts (HTA) are recorded on the date the futures price is set. Thus, HTA contracts are treated the same as selling futures contracts on the same date. Third, percentages of the crop sold through delayed pricing contracts are recorded on the date the cash price is established, which typically occurs after delivery.

Cross-Hedges

Cross-hedging is a marketing tool that can be recommended by an advisory program and occurs when a program includes within the set of recommendations for one commodity a transaction in another commodity market. For example, on September 22, 2003 one service recommended cross-hedging 2003 soybean production in March 2004 corn futures contracts. This type of position is based on the fact that prices for different commodities are correlated, that is, they move together. Advisory programs made only a few cross-hedge recommendations during the years considered in this study. In the cases where a cross-hedge is recommended, the percentage priced from such a position in futures or options markets is computed as:

Example of Marketing Profile Construction

A simple example of the construction of marketing profiles is considered in this section to facilitate understanding of the procedures used to develop actual marketing profiles for advisory services. The example is based on the following hypothetical set of soybean recommendations for the 2004 crop year:

Figure 1 presents the marketing profile for this set of recommendations. Since the first transaction was made on April 5^th , the net amount priced from the beginning of the crop year to this date equals 0%. On April 5^th the profile line in Figure 1 makes the first step, and the quantity priced becomes 30%, since short soybean futures have been recommended for 30% of expected production. The index computation according to equation (7) for April 5^th is:

The index value is the same until June 21^st when long puts are recommended for 50% of the expected production. Note in Figure 1 that on June 21^st the profile line has the second step, and on the dates following, the line takes values lower than 80% (30% + 50%). This happens because the absolute value of the put delta is always lower than one. For example, on the date that the put position is opened, the November soybean futures price is $6.79/bushel, which is lower than the strike price of $7.00/bushel, and therefore, the option is in-the-money. The option delta on June 21^st is -0.509, indicating the position is equivalent to a 25.45% (0.527*50%= 25.45%) short position for expected production. For June 21^st the value of the index is computed as:

For the period of time when the put option position is open, the line becomes irregular, reflecting the fact that option delta changes every day.

The cumulative percentage changes substantially on July 27^th, when there is a step down in the marketing profile line. On this date, the futures position is closed by buying futures, and hence, the amount priced decreased by 30%. From this date to August 20^th the line represents the amount priced only from the long put option position on 50% of the expected production. The value of the index on July 27^th is computed as:

On August 20^th the put position is closed and 50% of the expected production is sold under forward contracts, so the amount priced becomes 50%:

For the 2004 soybean crop, September 15^th is the first day of harvest, and therefore, on this date the percentage priced is adjusted to reflect actual yield. The expected yield for 2004 is 49.04 bushel/acre and the actual yield is 54 bushel/acre. Since the actual yield is higher than expected, the proportion priced decreases on the first day of harvest to reflect this adjustment. Note in Figure 1 that there is a small step up on the first day of harvest, and the value of the index, according to Equation (8), becomes 45.41%:

The last recommendation in this example occurs on March 18, 2005, when remaining production (54.59 %) is sold in the cash market and the amount priced becomes 100%:

Further Issues

There are three additional issues associated with interpretation of the marketing profiles that should be noted. The first is related to the use of option deltas to compute the net amount priced for option positions. Technically, deltas are valid only for “infinitesimal” price changes, which mean that deltas may be imprecise measures when large price changes are considered. For example, if an option position for 50% of the crop with a delta of 0.527 is recommended, it will be equivalent, in terms of price sensitivity, to a long position in the underlying futures contract for 26.35% (50%*0.527) of the crop. This equivalence, though, strictly holds only for small futures price changes. There is no hard and fast rule for what constitutes “small” versus “large” futures price changes. The key point is that the approximation becomes systematically less reliable the larger the price change considered. Please note that the approximation is not likely to be a significant concern since option delta estimates are updated daily and soybean futures price changes usually are constrained by daily price limits.

The second interpretation issue is associated with basis risk, which is uncertainty associated with the difference between the local cash price and the futures price. In constructing marketing profiles, the amount priced under futures contracts is treated the same as a forward contracts, even though pricing under futures contracts is subject to basis variability whereas this is not the case for pricing under forward contracts. This does not create a problem in constructing marketing profiles because the profiles are based on quantity priced, not on price levels, and hence, basis risk is not a consideration. However, when interpreting marketing profiles, it is important to recognize that different forms of pricing may be reflected in the same marketing profile at different points in time.

The third interpretation issue is associated with spread risk, defined as uncertainty about the price difference between futures contracts with different expiration dates. Spread risk is a consideration when a hedging strategy involves two transactions: first selling futures with a nearby expiration date and later rolling-over the position to another contract with expiration closer to the delivery date of the grain. When constructing marketing profiles, the futures positions are treated separately as one-transaction hedges. This does not create a problem in constructing marketing profiles because the profiles are based on quantity priced, not on price levels, and hence, spread risk is not a consideration. Once again, when interpreting marketing profiles, it is important to recognize that different forms of pricing may be reflected in the same marketing profile at different points in time.

Construction of LDP/MLG Profiles

The 1996 “Freedom-to-Farm” Act established a loan deficiency payment program for several agricultural commodities, including soybeans. Under this program, if market prices are below a Commodity Credit Corporation loan rate, farmers can receive payments from the US government for the difference between the loan rate and the market price. Since there is considerable flexibility in the way the loan payment can be claimed by the farmer, there is the opportunity for advisory programs to give recommendations for the implementation of this program. In those years when the market price is lower than the loan rate, the use of the loan program is an important part of marketing strategies, since loan programs recommendations can have a big effect on the net price received. Furthermore, most of the advisory programs evaluated in the AgMAS Project make recommendations about loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gain (LDP/MLG) when market prices drop below the loan rates. To provide information about the ways that advisory services recommend claiming the deficiency payments, LDP/MLG profiles are developed for the 2002 and 2004 crop years. LDP/MLG profiles are not considered for the 2003 crop year because central Illinois soybean prices were always above loan rates during the marketing year. Averages LDP/MLG profiles across programs are also developed for the 1998-2002 and 2004 crop years. The “LDP/MLG profile” for each advisory service is constructed by plotting the cumulative percentage of the crop on which the LDP/MLG is claimed along the marketing window. The construction of these profiles is simpler than the construction of marketing profiles described in the previous section, but some explanation is needed about the computations.

Specific decision rules are needed regarding pre-harvest forward contracts because it is possible for an advisory program to recommend taking the LDP on those sales before the grain is actually harvested and available for delivery in central Illinois. To begin, it is assumed that amounts sold for harvest delivery with pre-harvest forward contracts are delivered first during harvest. Since LDPs must be taken when title to the grain changes hands, LDPs are assigned as these “forward contract” quantities are harvested and delivered. This requires assumptions regarding the timing and speed of harvest. Earlier it was noted that a five-week harvest window is used to define harvest. This window is centered on the day nearest to the mid-point of harvest progress in central Illinois as reported by NASS. Various assumptions could be implemented regarding harvest progress during this window. Lacking more precise data, a reasonable assumption is that harvest progress for an individual representative farm is a linear function of time. Then, it is assumed that, starting on the first day of harvest, grain becomes available for delivery in equal amounts per day along the five-week harvest period. When forward cash sales have been made, the grain that becomes available is assumed to be delivered to cover these contracts and LDP/MLGs are assumed to be claimed at the delivery time. Other assumptions regarding the claim of LDP/MLGs for grain priced under futures and option contracts can be found in Irwin et al. (2006).

Summary of Marketing and LDP/MLG Profiles for Soybeans, 1995 – 2004 Crop Years

The figures in this report present marketing and LDP/MLG profiles from each advisory program followed in 2002, 2003, and 2004 by the AgMAS Project for soybeans and their respective averages profiles across 1995-2004. In certain cases the average profiles are presented for some, but not all 10 crop years, because either the program was dropped from the sample during this period of time or did not begin to be tracked until after the 1995 crop year. Table 1 presents a list of the programs whose marketing and LDP/MLG profiles are presented in this study. The reason why some programs are not included in all years over 1995-2004 also is listed in the “Comments” column of this table.

Figures 2.1 through 29.7 present the marketing and LDP/MLG profiles for individual programs in alphabetical order for the 2002 through 2004 crop years. For the programs that were tracked for more than two years, the average, maximum and minimum amount priced is computed and presented as a chart after the individual crop year figure.

The scale for the vertical axis of the figures generally runs from a negative 25% to a positive 125%, since, for the majority of the programs, the net amount priced varies between these two levels. However, a few programs have more extreme values of the percentage priced. Note that the amount priced is a measure of within-crop year price risk, as the higher the proportion of a crop priced, the lower the sensitivity of the value of the farmer’s position to crop price changes. When 100% of the crop is priced there is no price sensitivity, which means that changes in price do not affect the value of the farmer’s position. At the other extreme, when the amount priced is 0%, the value of the farmer’s position will vary in the same proportion as the change in price, that is, if soybean price increases by 5%, the value of the farmer’s position will also increase by 5%. A proportion of grain sold higher than 100% is called over-hedging, and is actually an overall short position in the soybean market. In this case, price changes have the opposite effect on the farmer’s position value. If soybean price increases, the value of the farmer’s position decreases and vice versa. For some programs it is possible to find a negative amount priced, indicating a net long position greater than total production. This can be interpreted as the farmer owning even more grain than expected or actual production. In this case, price sensitivity is even greater than with 0% of grain priced. For example, if the proportion of grain sold is -50%, when soybean prices decrease by 10%, the value of the farmer’s position decreases 15%.

The scale for the horizontal axis of the figures corresponds to the two-year marketing window, that is, from September 1^st of the year previous to harvest through August 31^st of the year after harvest. However, a few programs begin their marketing recommendations over a particular crop year earlier than September 1^st, and in these cases the figures start with a positive net percentage priced. Similarly, a few programs continue their marketing recommendations for a period longer than the end of the two-year marketing window. In these cases, the net amount priced at the end of the graph is less than 100%.

The marketing profiles also provide other useful information. The number of steps in the profile lines and the location of these steps along the marketing season provide information about timing, frequency and size of recommended transactions. It is also possible to determine from the figures how intensely a program uses options markets, since, because deltas change daily, the profile line is irregular when options positions are open. In the same way, LDP/MLG profiles provide information about the size and timing of LDP/MLG claims.

Figures 30.1 through 39.4 contain the averages, maximums and minimums for marketing and LDP/MLG profiles across all advisory programs tracked in each crop year from 1995 to 2004 as well as the comparisons between those averages and the 24- and 20-month market benchmark profiles for each crop year. Figure 40.1 contains the marketing profile grand average, maximum and minimum across all services over the 1995–2004 crop years. Figure 40.2 compares the grand average to 24- and 20-month market benchmark profiles. Market benchmarks are those employed by the AgMAS project in the advisory services performance evaluation, and they measure the average price offered by the market to farmers during the marketing window. Under the 24-month market benchmark, the crop is sold in approximately equal amounts each day along the two-year marketing window beginning on September 1^st of the year before harvest and ending on August 31^st of the year after harvest. Under the 20-month benchmark the crop is sold in approximately equal amounts every day during the period that begins on January 1^st of the year of harvest and ends on August 31^st of the year after harvest. Figure 41.1 contains the LDP/MLG profile grand average, maximum and minimum across all services over the 1998-2002 and 2004 crop years. Finally, Figure 41.2 compares the LDP/MLG grand average to the 24- and 20-months market benchmark LDP/MLG profiles. Note that those figures where average marketing profiles and LDP/MLG profiles are developed the first day of harvest is an average of the first day of harvest across the set of years included in the chart.

References

Bertoli, R., C. Zulauf, S. H. Irwin, T. E. Jackson and D. L. Good. "The Marketing Style of Advisory Services for Corn and Soybeans in 1995." AgMAS Project Research Report 1999-02, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, August 1999. ((http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/agmas/reports/1999-02/agmas_1999-02.html))

Brown, S.J. and W.N. Goetzmann. "Mutual Fund Styles." Journal of Financial Economics, 43(1997):373-399.

Brown, S.J. and W.N. Goetzmann. "Hedge Funds With Style." Working Paper No. 00-29, Yale International Center for Finance, Yale University, February 2001.

Black F. "The Pricing of Commodity Contracts." Journal of Financial Economics, 3(1976): 167-179.

Colino, E. V., S.M. Cabrini, S.H. Irwin, D.L. Good and J. Martines-Filho. "Advisory Service Marketing Profiles for Corn in 2001." AgMAS Project Research Report 2004-02, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, April 2004.
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Endnotes